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Abstract
We prove the existence of competitive equilibrium in a single-sector dy-
namic economy with heterogeneous agents and elastic labor supply. The
method of proof relies on exploiting the existence of Lagrange multipli-
ers in infinite dimensional spaces and the link between Pareto-optima and
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1 Introduction
This paper deals with existence of a competitive equilibrium in a one-sector
growth model with heterogeneous agents and endogenous leisure. The issue of
endogenous labor supply in intertemporal models have been analyzed before.
These models focused on the existence and uniqueness of stationary equilibrium
paths in stochastic infinite horizon economies with elastic labor that are subject
to externalities, taxes or other distortions. See, for example, Greenwood and
Huffman [1995], Coleman(1997), and Datta et al. [2002]. Although models
with elastic labor have provided the basic framework for a substantial body of
applied work in macroeconomics, there are few studies that are concerned with
the question of existence of equilibria, especially for models with heterogeneous
agents and endogenous leisure.
The question of existence of a competitive equilibrium in a one-sector growth
model with heterogeneous agents with inelastic labor supply have been studied
by Le Van and Vailakis [2003] in which they used the Pareto-optimum prob-
lem involving individual weights in a social value function and constituted a
price equilibrium with transfers. Recently, Nguyen and Nguyen Van [2005]
have proved the existence of a competitive equilibrium in a version of a Ramsey
model for only one agent in which leisure enters the utility function by exploiting
the existence of Lagrange multipliers in infinite dimensional spaces and their
representation as a summable sequence that relies on some results in LeVan
and Saglam [2004]. To develop these above methods for the heterogeneous-
agents Ramsey model studied in Le Van-Vailakis[2003] is extended to include
an endogenous non-reproducible factor such as labor, this paper exploits the
existence of Lagrange multipliers in infinite dimensional spaces and the link
between Pareto-optima and competitive equilibria for studying the existence of
competitive equilibrium without attempting to impose the usual Inada condi-
tions.
Following the pioneer work of Debreu (1954), Bewley [1972] studied the ex-
istence of equilibrium in an economy in which l∞ is the commodity space and
the method of using the limit of equilibria of finite dimensional economies. The
most important development since Bewley’s work was provided by Mas-Collel
[1986], by using Negishi’s approach when the commodity space is a topological
vector lattice. Many others works can be found in Florenzano [1983], Alipran-
tis et al. [1990], Mas-Collel and Zame [1991], Dana and Le Van [1991],...Their
methods yield a general results but require a high level of abstraction. Our
simple approach uses the existence of Lagrange multipliers in infinite dimen-
sional spaces and their representation as a summable sequence to show that the
necessary conditions of the planner’s problem guarantee the existence of a set of
multipliers or shadow prices which together with the optimal allocations satisfy
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the sufficient conditions for the optimization problems of the consumer and the
firm. The existence of a competitive equilibrium is carried out by exploiting
the link between Pareto-optima and competitive equilibria (Negishi method) in
which the Browder fixed-point theorem for multivalued maps with boundary
condition is used.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the economic environ-
ment and characterizes the competitive equilibrium for this economy. In section
3 we describe the Pareto-optimum problem and prove existence of Lagrange
multipliers in `1+. Section 4 proves the existence of a competitive equilibrium.
2 Characterization of Equilibrium
We consider an intertemporal one-sector model with m ≥ 1 consumers and one
firm. The preferences of each consumer take additively form:
∑∞
t=0 β
t
iui(c
i
t, l
i
t)
where βi ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor. At date t, agent i consumes the quantity
cit, spends a quantity of leisure l
i
t and supplies a quantity of labor L
i
t. Produc-
tion possibilities are presented by gross production function F and a physical
depreciation δ ∈ (0, 1)
For any initial condition k0 ≥ 0, when a sequence k = (k0, k1, ..., kt, ...)
such that 0 ≤ kt+1 ≤ F (kt,m) + (1 − δ)kt for all t, we say it is feasible
from k0 and we denote the class of feasible capital paths by Π(k0). Let ct =
(c1t , c
2
t , ...c
m
t ) denote the m−vector of consumptions and lt = (l1t , l2t , ...lmt ) de-
note m-vector of leisure of all agents at date t. A pair of consumption-leisure
sequences (c, l) = ((c0, l0),(c1, l1), ...) is feasible from k0 ≥ 0 if there exists a
sequence k ∈ Π(k0) that satisfies
m∑
i=1
cit + kt+1 ≤ F (kt,
m∑
i=1
(1− lit)) + (1− δ)kt and 0 ≤ lit ≤ 1∀t.
The set of feasible from k0 consumption-leisure is denoted by
∑
(k0).
We make the following assumptions:
A1: For i = 1, ...,m, ui(c, l) ∈ R+ if (c, l) ∈ R2+, ui(c, l) = −∞ if (c, l) /∈ R2+
, ui is strictly increasing, strictly concave and continuous in R2+. Moreover,
ui(0, 0) = 0, and ∀i, limε→0 ui(ε,1)ε < +∞.
A2: The gross production function F (k, L) ∈ R+ if (k, L) ∈ R2+, F (k, L) =
−∞ if (k, L) /∈ R2+, F strictly increasing, strictly concave and continuous in
R2+. Moreover, F (0, L) = F (k, 0) = 0, Fk(0,m) > δ and lim
k→+∞
Fk(k,m) = 0.
Observe that ui(0, 0) = 0 in A1 is weaker than than assuming ui(0, l) =
ui(c, 0) = 0 and there is no need to impose Inada conditions on utility functions.
InA2, we only require the capital’s marginal to be greater than the depreciation
rate that is weaker than Fk(0,m) > 1minβi −1+ δ. Neither Inada conditions nor
homogeneous property required on production function.
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Define f(kt, Lt) = F (kt, Lt) + (1− δ)kt. Assumption A2 implies that
f
′
k(+∞,m) = Fk(+∞,m) + (1− δ) = 1− δ < 1
f
′
k(0,m) = Fk(0,m) + (1− δ) > 1.
From above, it follows that there exists k > 0 such that: (i) f(k,m) = k ,
(ii) k > k implies f(k,m) < k, (iii) k < k implies f(k,m) > k. Therefore for
any k ∈ Π(k0), we have 0 ≤ kt ≤ max(k0, k). Thus, a feasible sequence k ∈ l∞+
which in turn implies a feasible sequence (c, l) ∈ l∞+ × [0, 1]∞.
Now, we give the characterization of Equilibrium. For each consumer i,
denote:
A sequence of prices (p0, p1,...) ∈ l1+\{0},a price r > 0 for the initial capital
stock.
A consumption allocation ci = (ci0, c
i
1, ...c
i
t, ...) where c
i
t denote the quantity
which agent i consumes at date t.
A sequence of capital stocks k = (k0, k1, ...kt, ...) where k0 is the initial en-
dowment of capital.
Denote αi > 0 is the share the profit of the firm owned by consumer i,
m∑
i=1
αi = 1.
Denote ϑi > 0 is the share of initial endowment owned by consumer i,
m∑
i=1
ϑi = 1 and ϑi k0 is the endowment of consumer i.
A sequence of leisure li = (li0, l
i
1, ..., l
i
t, ...), a sequence of labor supply L
i =
(Li0, L
i
1, ..., L
i
t, ...) with L
i
t = 1− lit.
A sequence of wage w = (w0, w1, ...., wt, ...).
In what follows we show that with an allocation {ci∗,k∗, li∗,Li∗},one can
associate a price sequence p∗ for consumption good, a wage sequence w∗ for
labor and a price r for the initial capital stock k0 such that
i)
c∗ ∈ l∞+ , li∗ ∈ l∞+ ,Li∗ ∈ l∞+ ,k∗ ∈ l∞+ ,p∗ ∈ l1+,w∗ ∈ l1+, r > 0.
ii)For every i, (ci∗, li∗) is a solution to the problem
max
∑∞
t=0 β
t
iui(c
i
t, l
i
t)
s.t
∑∞
t=0
p∗t cit +
∞∑
t=0
w∗t lit ≤
∞∑
t=0
w∗t+ϑ
irk0 + αipi∗
where pi∗ is the maximum profit of the single firm.
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iii) (k∗,L∗) is a solution to the firm’s problem:
pi∗ = max
∞∑
t=0
p∗tF (kt, Lt)−
∞∑
t=0
p∗t (kt+1 − (1− δ)kt)
−
∞∑
t=0
w∗tLt − rk0
st 0 ≤ kt+1 ≤ F (kt, Lt) + (1− δ)kt), 0 ≤ Lt,∀t
iv)Markets clear: ∀t,
m∑
i=0
ci∗t + k
∗
t+1 − (1− δ)k∗t = F (k∗t ,
m∑
i=1
Li∗t ),
li∗t + L
i∗
t = 1, L
∗
t =
m∑
i=1
Li
∗
t and k
∗
0 = k0.
3 Lagrange Multipliers for Pareto-Optimum Prob-
lem
We prove the existence of a competitive equilibrium by studying the Pareto
optimum problem. Let ∆ = {η1, η2, ..., ηm|ηi ≥ 0 and
∑m
i=0 ηi = 1}.
Define the Pareto problem
max
m∑
i=1
ηi
∞∑
t=0
βtiui(c
i
t, l
i
t) (P)
subject to
m∑
i=1
cit + kt+1 ≤ F (kt,
m∑
i=1
(1− lit)) + (1− δ)kt ∀t ≥ 0
∀i = 1...m, ∀t ≥ 0
−cit ≤ 0
−kt ≤ 0
−lit ≤ 0
lit − 1 ≤ 0
k0 ≥ 0 is given.
Note that, for all k0 ≥ 0, 0 ≤ kt ≤ max(k0, k) = A, then 0 ≤ cit ≤ f(A,m) ∀t,
∀i = 1...m.
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Define the sequence
uni (c
i, li) =
n∑
i=1
βtiui(c
i
t, l
i
t).
Since this sequence is increasing and bounded, it converges, and we can write
m∑
i=1
ηi
∞∑
t=0
βtiui(c
i
t, l
i
t) =
∞∑
t=0
m∑
i=1
ηiβ
t
iui(c
i
t, l
i
t)
Denote c = (c1, c2, ..., ci, ..., cm) where ci = (ci0, c
i
1, ...c
i
t, ...),
l = (l1, l2, ..., li, ..., lm) where li = (li0, l
i
1, ...l
i
t, ...),
x = (c,k, l) ∈ (l∞+ )m × l∞+ × (l∞+ )m.Define
F(x) = −
∞∑
t=0
m∑
i=1
ηiβ
t
iui(c
i
t, l
i
t)
Φ1t (x) =
m∑
i=1
cit + kt+1 − F (kt,
m∑
i=1
(1− lit))− (1− δ)kt ∀t
Φ2it (x) = −cit,∀t,∀i = 1...m
Φ3t (x) = −kt, ∀t
Φ4it (x) = −lit,∀t,∀i = 1...m
Φ5it (x) = l
i
t − 1,∀t,∀i = 1...m
Φt = (Φ1t ,Φ
2i
t ,Φ
3
t+1,Φ
4i
t ,Φ
5i
t ), ∀t,∀i = 1...m
The Pareto problem can be written as:
minF(x)
s.t.Φ(x) ≤ 0,x ∈ (l∞+ )m × l∞+ × (l∞+ )m
where:
F : (l∞+ )m × l∞+ × (l∞+ )m → R ∪ {+∞}
Φ = (Φt)t=0...∞ : (l∞+ )
m × l∞+ × (l∞+ )m → R ∪ {+∞}
Let C = dom(F) = {x ∈ (l∞+ )m × l∞+ × (l∞+ )m|F(x) < +∞}
Γ = dom(Φ) = {x ∈ (l∞+ )m × l∞+ × (l∞+ )m|Φt(x) < +∞, ∀t}.
The following theorem follows from Theorem1 and Theorem2 in Le Van and
Saglam [2004].
Theorem 1 Let x, y ∈ (l∞+ )m × l∞+ × (l∞+ )m, T ∈ N .
Define xTt (x,y) =
{
xt if t ≤ T
yt if t > T
Suppose that two following assumptions are satisfied:
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T1: If x ∈ C, y ∈ (l∞+ )m × l∞+ × (l∞+ )m satisfy ∀T ≥ T0, xT (x,y) ∈ C then
F(xT (x,y))→ F(x) when T →∞.
T2: If x ∈ Γ, y ∈ Γ and xT (x,y) ∈ Γ, ∀T ≥ T0.
Then,
a) Φt(xT (x,y))→ Φt(x)as T →∞
b) ∃Ms.t.∀T ≥ T0, ‖Φt(xT (x,y))‖ ≤M
c) ∀N ≥ T0, lim
t→∞[Φt(x
T (x,y))− Φt(y)] = 0
Let x∗ be a solution to (P) and x ∈ C satisfy the Slater condition:
sup
t
Φt(x) < 0.
Suppose xT (x∗,x) ∈ C ∩ Γ. Then, there exists Λ ∈ l1+ such that
F(x) +ΛΦ(x) ≥ F(x∗) + ΛΦ(x∗), ∀x ∈ (C ∩ Γ)
and ΛΦ(x∗) = 0.
Obviously, for any η ∈ ∆, an optimal path will depend on η. In what
follows, we will suppress η and denote by (ci∗,k∗,Li∗, li∗) any optimal path for
each agent i if possible.
Proposition 1 If x∗ = (ci∗,k∗, li∗) is a solution to the following problem:
−min
∞∑
t=0
m∑
i=1
ηiβ
t
iui(c
i
t, l
i
t)
s.t.
m∑
i=1
cit + kt+1 ≤ F (kt
m∑
i=1
(1− lit)) + (1− δ)kt ∀t ≥ 0
−cit ≤ 0,∀i = 1...m, ∀t ≥ 0
−kt ≤ 0,∀t ≥ 0
−lit ≤ 0,∀i = 1...m, ∀t ≥ 0
lit − 1 ≤ 0,∀i = 1...m, ∀t ≥ 0
k0 ≥ 0 is given.
Then there exists, ∀i = 1...m, λ = (λ1,λ2i,λ3,λ4i,λ5i) ∈ l1+× (l1+)m × l1+ ×
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(l1+)
m × (l1+)m such that: ∀x = (c,k, l) ∈ (l∞+ )m × l∞+ × (l∞+ )m
∞∑
t=0
m∑
i=1
ηiβ
t
iui(c
i∗
t , l
i∗
t )−
∞∑
t=0
λ1t (
m∑
i=1
ci∗t + k
∗
t+1 − F (k∗t ,
m∑
i=1
(1− li∗t )))
−(1− δ)k∗t ) +
∞∑
t=0
λ2it c
i∗
t
∞
+
∑
t=0
λ3tk
∗
t
∞
+
∑
t=0
λ4it l
i∗
t +
∞∑
t=0
λ5it (1− li∗t )
≥
∞∑
t=0
m∑
i=1
ηiβ
t
iui(c
i
t, l
i
t)−
∞∑
t=0
λ1t (
m∑
i=1
cit + kt+1 − F (kt,
m∑
i=1
(1− lit)))
−(1− δ)kt) +
∞∑
t=0
λ2it c
i
t
∞
+
∑
t=0
λ3tkt
∞
+
∑
t=0
λ4it l
i
t +
∞∑
t=0
λ5it (1− lit) (1)
λ1t [
m∑
i=1
ci∗t + k
∗
t+1 − F (k∗t ,
m∑
i=1
Li∗t )− (1− δ)k∗t ] = 0 (2)
λ2it c
i∗
t = 0,∀i = 1...m (3)
λ3tk
∗
t = 0 (4)
λ4it l
i∗
t = 0,∀i = 1...m (5)
λ5it (1− li∗t ) = 0,∀i = 1...m (6)
0 ∈ ηiβti∂1ui(ci∗t , li∗t )− {λ1t }+ {λ2it },∀i = 1...m (7)
0 ∈ ηiβti∂2ui(ci∗t , li∗t )− λ1t∂2F (k∗t , L∗t ) + {λ4it } − {λ5it },∀i = 1...m (8)
0 ∈ λ1t∂1F (k∗t , L∗t ) + {(1− δ)λ1t }+ {λ3t } − {λ1t−1} (9)
where, L∗t =
m∑
i=1
Li∗t =
m∑
i=1
(1 − li∗t ), ∂ju(ci∗t , li∗t ), ∂jF (k∗t , L∗t ) respectively de-
note the projection on the jth component of the subdifferential of function u at
(ci∗t , li∗t ) and the function F at (k∗t , L∗t ).
Proof : We show that the Slater condition holds. Since f ′k(0,m) > 1, then
for all k0 > 0, there exists some 0 < k̂ < k0 such that: 0 < k̂ < f(k̂,m) and
0 < k̂ < f(k0,m).Thus, there exists two small positive numbers ε, ε1 such that:
0 < k̂ + ε < f(k̂,m− ε1) and 0 < k̂ + ε < f(k0,m− ε1).
Denote x = (c,k, l) such that c = (c1, c2, ...,ci, ..., cm), where
ci = (ct
i)t=0,...∞ = (
ε
m
,
ε
m
,
ε
m
, ...)
l = (l
1
, l
2
, ...,l
i
, ..., l
m
), where
l
i
= (lt
i
)t=0,...∞ = (
ε1
m
,
ε1
m
,
ε1
m
, .....).
7
and k = (k0, k̂, k̂, ...). We have
Φ10(x) =
m∑
i=0
ci0 + k1 ≤ F (k0,
m∑
i=1
(1− li0)) + (1− δ)k0
= ε+ k̂ − f(k0,m− ε1) < 0
Φ11(x) =
m∑
i=0
ci1 + k2 ≤ F (k1,
m∑
i=1
(1− li1)) + (1− δ)k1
= ε+ k̂ − f(k̂,m− ε1) < 0
Φ1t (x) = ε+ k̂ − f(k̂,m− ε1) < 0, ∀t ≥ 2
Φ2it (x) = −cti = −
ε
m
< 0, ∀t ≥ 0,∀i = 1...m
Φ30(x) = −k0 < 0;
Φ3t (x) = −k̂ < 0 ∀t ≥ 1.
Φ4it (x) = −
ε1
m
< 0, ∀t ≥ 0,∀i = 1...m
Φ5it (x) =
ε1
m
− 1 < 0, ∀t ≥ 0,∀i = 1...m
Therefore the Slater condition is satisfied. Now, it is obvious that, ∀T, xT (x∗,x)
belongs to (l∞+ )m × l∞+ × (l∞+ )m.
As in Le Van-Saglam 2004, Assumption T2 is satisfied. We now check
Assumption T1.
For any x˜ ∈ C, ˜˜x ∈ (l∞+ )m × l∞+ × (l∞+ )m such that for any T, xT (x˜, ˜˜x) ∈ C
we have
F(xT (x˜, ˜˜x)) = − T∑
t=0
m∑
i=1
ηiβ
t
iui(c˜it, l˜it)−
∞∑
t=T+1
m∑
i=1
ηiβ
t
iui(
˜˜
cit,
˜˜
lit).
As ˜˜x ∈ (l∞+ )m × l∞+ × (l∞+ )m, sup
t
| ˜˜ct| < +∞ , there exists a > 0,∀t, | ˜˜ct| ≤ a.
Since β ∈ (0, 1),as T →∞ we have
0 ≤
∞
|
∑
t=T+1
m∑
i=1
ηiβ
t
iui(
˜˜
cit,
˜˜
lit)| ≤ u(a, 1)
∞∑
t=T+1
m∑
i=1
ηiβ
t
i =
m∑
i=1
∞∑
t=T+1
ηiβ
t
i → 0 .
Hence, F(xT (x˜, ˜˜x)) → F(x˜) when T → ∞.Taking account of the Theorem 1,
we get (1) - (6).
Obviously, ∩mi=1ri(dom(ui)) 6= ∅ where ri(dom(ui)) is the relative interior of
dom(ui). It follows from the Proposition 6.5.5 in Florenzano and Le Van (2001),
we have
∂
m∑
i=1
ηiβ
t
iui(c
i∗
t , l
i∗
t ) = ηiβ
t
i
m∑
i=1
∂ui(ci∗t , l
i∗
t )
We then get (7) - (9) from the Kuhn-Tucker first-order conditions.
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4 Existence of a Competitive Equilibrium
With the optimal path c∗(η), k∗(η), l∗(η), L∗(η) we have proved that there
exists the Lagrange multipliers
λ(η) = (λ1(η),λ2i(η),λ3(η),λ4i(η),λ5i(η)) ∈l1+× (l1+)m × l1+ × (l1+)m ×
(l1+)
m, i = 1...m, for the Pareto problem. As in the previous section we will
suppress η whenever it is impossible.
We will prove that there exits f2t (k
∗
t , L
∗
t ) ∈ ∂2F (k∗t , L∗t ),where L∗t =
m∑
i=1
Li∗t ,
then one can associate a sequence of prices p∗t , a sequence of wages w∗t defined
as
p∗t = λ
1
t ∀t
w∗t = λ
1
t f
2
t (k
∗
t , L
∗
t ) ∀t
and a price r > 0 for the initial capital stock k0 such that ( c∗, k∗, l∗,L∗,p∗,w∗, r
) is a price equilibrium with transfers. That means
i)
c∗ ∈ (l∞+ )m, l∗ ∈ (l∞+ )m,k∗ ∈ l∞+ ,p∗ ∈ l1+,w∗ ∈ l1+, r > 0
ii) For every i = 1...m, (ci∗, li∗) is a solution to the problem
max
∞∑
t=0
βtiui(c
i
t, l
i
t)
st
∞∑
t=0
p∗t c
i
t +
∞∑
t=0
w∗t l
i
t ≤
∞∑
t=0
p∗t c
i∗
t +
∞∑
t=0
w∗t l
i∗
t
iii) (k∗,L∗) is a solution to the firm’s problem:
pi∗ = max
∞∑
t=0
p∗tF (kt, Lt)−
∞∑
t=0
p∗t (kt+1 − (1− δ)kt)
−
∞∑
t=0
w∗tLt − rk0
st 0 ≤ kt+1 ≤ F (kt, Lt) + (1− δ)kt), 0 ≤ Lt,∀t
iv)Markets clear
∀t,
m∑
i=0
ci∗t + k∗t+1 − (1− δ)k∗t = F (k∗t ,
m∑
i=1
Li∗t ),
L∗t =
m∑
i=1
Li∗t , li∗t = 1− Li∗t and k∗0 = k0
Lemma 1 Let k0 > 0. The sequence of wages w∗t defined as
w∗t = λ
1
t f
2
t (k
∗
t , L
∗
t ) ∀t where f2t (k∗t , L∗t ) ∈ ∂2F (k∗t , L∗t )
is a sequence which belong to l1+.
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Proof : Consider λ(η) = (λ1,λ2i,λ3,λ4i,λ5i) of Proposition 1. Conditions
(7),(8),(9) in Proposition 1 show that ∀i = 1...m, ∂ui(ci∗t , li∗t ) and ∂F (k∗t , L∗t )
are nonempty. Moreover,∀t,∀i = 1...m, there exists u1it (ci∗t , li∗t ) ∈ ∂1ui(ci∗t , li∗t ),
u2it (c
i∗
t , l
i∗
t ) ∈ ∂2ui(ci∗t , li∗t ), f1t (k∗t , L∗t ) ∈ ∂1F (k∗t , L∗t )and f2t (k∗t , L∗t ) ∈ ∂2F (k∗t , L∗t )
such that
ηiβ
t
iu
1i
t (c
i∗
t , l
i∗
t )− λ1t + λ2it = 0,∀i = 1...m (10)
ηiβ
t
iu
2i
t (c
i∗
t , l
i∗
t )− λ1t f2t (k∗t , L∗t ) + λ4it − λ5it = 0,∀i = 1...m (11)
λ1t f
1
t (k
∗
t , L
∗
t ) + (1− δ)λ1t + λ3t − λ1t−1 = 0 (12)
We have
+∞ >
∞∑
t=0
βtiui(c
i∗
t , l
i∗
t )−
∞∑
t=0
βtiui(0, 0) ≥
∞∑
t=0
βtiu
1i
t (c
i∗
t , l
i∗
t )c
i∗
t +
∞∑
t=0
βtiu
2i
t (c
i∗
t , l
i∗
t )l
i∗
t ,∀i = 1...m
which implies
∞∑
t=0
βtiu
2i
t (c
i∗
t , l
i∗
t )l
i∗
t < +∞,∀i = 1...m (13)
and for any i,
+∞ >
∞∑
t=0
λ1tF (k
∗
t , L
∗
t )−
∞∑
t=0
λ1tF (0, L
∗
t − Li∗t ) ≥
∞∑
t=0
λ1t f
1
t (k
∗
t , L
∗
t )k
∗
t +
∞∑
t=0
λ1t f
2
t (k
∗
t , L
∗
t )L
i∗
t
which implies
∞∑
t=0
λ1t f
2
t (k
∗
t , L
∗
t )L
i∗
t < +∞. (14)
Given T, we multiply (11), for each i, by Li∗t and sum from 0 to T . We then
obtain
∀T,
T∑
t=0
ηiβ
t
iu
2i
t (c
i∗
t , l
i∗
t )L
i∗
t =
T∑
t=0
λ1t f
2
t (k
∗
t , L
∗
t )L
i∗
t (15)
−
T∑
t=0
λ4it L
i∗
t +
T∑
t=0
λ5it L
i∗
t ,∀i = 1...m
Observe that
0 ≤
∞∑
t=0
λ5it L
i∗
t ≤
∞∑
t=0
λ5it < +∞,∀i = 1...m (16)
0 ≤
∞∑
t=0
λ4it L
i∗
t ≤
∞∑
t=0
λ4it < +∞,∀i = 1...m (17)
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Thus, since Li∗t = 1− li∗t ,∀i = 1...m, from (15), we get
T∑
t=0
ηiβ
t
iu
2i
t (c
i∗
t , l
i∗
t ) =
T∑
t=0
ηiβ
t
iu
2i
t (c
i∗
t , l
i∗
t )l
i∗
t +
T∑
t=0
λ1t f
2
t (k
∗
t , L
∗
t )L
i∗
t
+
T∑
t=0
λ5it L
i∗
t −
T∑
t=0
λ4it L
i∗
t
Using (13),(14),(16),(17) and letting T →∞, we obtain
0 ≤
∞∑
t=0
ηiβ
t
iu
2i
t (c
i∗
t , l
i∗
t ) =
∞∑
t=0
ηiβ
t
iu
2i
t (c
i∗
t , l
i∗
t )l
i∗
t +
∞∑
t=0
λ1t f
2
t (k
∗
t , L
∗
t )L
i∗
t +
∞∑
t=0
λ5it L
i∗
t −
∞∑
t=0
λ4it L
i∗
t < +∞
Consequently, from (11),
∞∑
t=0
w∗t =
∞∑
t=0
λ1t f
2
t (k
∗
t , L
∗
t ) < +∞ i.e. w∗ ∈ l1+.
Theorem 2 Let ( k∗, c∗,L∗, l∗) solve Problem (P). Take
p∗t = λ
1
t , w
∗
t = λ
1
t f
2
t (k
∗
t , L
∗
t ) for any t
and r =
λ10(1− δ)
2
> 0.
Then {c∗,k∗,L∗,p∗,w∗, r} is a price equilibrium with transfers .
Proof : From Proposition 1 and Lemma 1, we get
c∗ ∈ (l∞+ )m, l∗ ∈ (l∞+ )m,k∗ ∈ l∞+ ,p∗ ∈ l1+,w∗ ∈ l1+, r > 0.
We now show that (ci∗, li∗) solves the consumer’s problem. Let (ci, li) satisfies
∞∑
t=0
p∗t c
i
t +
∞∑
t=0
w∗t l
i
t ≤
∞∑
t=0
p∗t c
i∗
t +
∞∑
t=0
w∗t l
i∗
t .
By the concavity of ui, we have:
∞∑
t=0
βtiui(c
i∗
t , l
i∗
t )−
∞∑
t=0
βtiui(c
i
t, l
i
t)
≥
∞∑
t=0
βtiu
1i
t (c
i∗
t , l
i∗
t )(c
i∗
t − cit) +
∞∑
t=0
βtiu
2i
t (c
i∗
t , l
i∗
t ) (l
i∗
t − lit).
Combining (3 ),(6),(10),(11) yields that
∆ ≥
∞∑
t=0
(λ1t − λ2it )
ηi
(ci∗t − cit) +
∞∑
t=0
(λ1t f
2
t (k
∗
t , L
∗
t )− λ4it + λ5it )
ηi
(li∗t − lit)
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=
∞∑
t=0
λ1t
ηi
(ci∗t − cit) +
∞∑
t=0
λ2it
ηi
cit −
∞∑
t=0
λ2it
ηi
ci∗t +
∞∑
t=0
λ1t f
2
t (k
∗
t , L
∗
t )
ηi
(li∗t − lit)
+
∞∑
t=0
λ5it
ηi
(li∗t − lit)−
∞∑
t=0
λ4it
ηi
li∗t +
∞∑
t=0
λ4it
ηi
lit
≥
∞∑
t=0
λ1t
ηi
(ci∗t − cit) +
∞∑
t=0
λ1t f
2
t (k
∗
t , L
∗
t )
ηi
(li∗t − lit) +
∞∑
t=0
λ5it (1− lit)
ηi
≥
∞∑
t=0
λ1t
ηi
(ci∗t − cit) +
∞∑
t=0
λ1t f
2
t (k
∗
t , L
∗
t )
ηi
(li∗t − lit)
=
∞∑
t=0
p∗t
ηi
(ci∗t − cit) +
∞∑
t=0
w∗t
ηi
(li∗t − lit) ≥ 0.
This means (ci∗, li∗) solves the consumer’s problem.
We show that (k∗,L∗) is solution to the firm’s problem. Since p∗t = λ
1
t ,
w∗t = λ
1
t f
2
t (k
∗
t , L
∗
t ), we have
pi∗ =
∞∑
t=0
λ1t [F (k
∗
t , L
∗
t ) + (1− δ)k∗t − k∗t+1]
−
∞∑
t=0
λ1t f
2
t (k
∗
t , L
∗
t ) L
∗
t − rk0.
Let :
∆T =
T∑
t=0
λ1t [F (k
∗
t , L
∗
t ) + (1− δ)k∗t − k∗t+1]−
T∑
t=0
λ1t f
2
t (k
∗
t , L
∗
t ) L
∗
t − rk0
−
(
T∑
t=0
λ1t [F (kt, Lt) + (1− δ)kt − kt+1]−
T∑
t=0
λ1t f
2
t (k
∗
t , L
∗
t )Lt − rk0
)
By the concavity of F , we get
∆T ≥
T∑
t=1
λ1t f
1
t (k
∗
t , L
∗
t )(k
∗
t − kt) + (1− δ)
T∑
t=1
λ1t (k
∗
t − kt)−
T∑
t=0
λ1t (k
∗
t+1 − kt+1) = [λ11f1t (k∗1, L∗1) + (1− δ)λ11 − λ10](k∗1 − k1) + ...
+[λ1T f
1
t (k
∗
T , L
∗
T ) + (1− δ)λ1T − λ1T−1](k∗T − kT )− λ1T (k∗T+1 − kT+1).
By (4) and (12), we have: ∀t = 1, 2, ..., T
[λ1t f
1
t (k
∗
t , L
∗
t ) + (1− δ)λ1t − λ1t−1](k∗t − kt) = −λ3t (k∗t − kt) = λ3tkt ≥ 0. (18)
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Thus,
∆T ≥ −λ1T (k∗T+1 − kT+1) = −λ1Tk∗T+1 + λ1TkT+1 ≥ −λ1Tk∗T+1.
Since λ1 ∈ l1+, sup
T
k∗T+1 < +∞, we have
lim
T→+∞
∆T ≥ lim
T→+∞
− λ1Tk∗T+1 = 0.
We have proved that the sequences (k∗,L∗) maximize the profit of the firm.
The appropriate transfer to each consumer is the amount that just allows the
consumer to afford the consumption stream allocated by the social optimization
problem. Thus, for given weights η ∈ ∆, the required transfers are:
φi(η) =
∞∑
t=0
λ1t (η)c
i∗
t (η) +
∞∑
t=0
w∗t (η)l
i∗
t (η)−
∞∑
t=0
w∗t (η)−ϑirk0 − αipi∗(η)
where
pi∗(η) =
∞∑
t=0
λ1t (η)F (k
∗
t (η), L
∗
t (η))−
∞∑
t=0
λ1t (η)(k
∗
t+1(η)− (1− δ)k∗t (η))
−
∞∑
t=0
w∗t (η)L
∗
t (η)− rk0.
A competitive equilibrium for this economy corresponds to a set of welfare
weights η ∈ ∆ such that these transfers equal to zero.
Proposition 2 i) Let k0 > 0 . Then for any η ∈ ∆, pi∗(η) > 0.
ii) If ηi = 0 then ∀t, ci∗t = 0, li∗t = 0.
Proof : i) Let (k0, 0, 0, ...) ∈ Π(k0). Then
pi∗(η) ≥ λ10(η)[F (k0, 0) + (1− δ)k0]− rk0
= λ10(η)(1− δ)k0 − rk0 > 0
ii) Let ηi = 0. Suppose for simplicity that ci∗0 > 0.
Let j satisfies ηj > 0. Define ci∗∗0 = 0, c
j∗∗
0 = c
j∗
0 + c
i∗
0 . We have
ηiui(c
i∗∗
0 , l
i∗
0 ) = ηiui(c
i∗
0 , l
i∗
0 ) = 0, ηjuj(c
j∗∗
0 , l
j∗
0 ) > ηjuj(c
j∗
0 , l
j∗
0 ).
Hence we get new utility is greater than the optimum which leads to contradic-
tion. Now, assume that li∗0 > 0.
Let j satisfies ηj > 0. Define
cj∗∗0 = F (k0,m−
∑
k 6=i
lk0) + (1− δ)k0 − k1 −
∑
k 6=j
ck∗0
li∗∗0 = 0
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We have cj∗∗0 > c
j∗
0 and
ηiui(c
i∗
0 , l
i∗∗
0 ) = ηiui(c
i∗
0 , l
i∗
0 ) = 0, ηjuj(c
j∗∗
0 , l
j∗
0 ) > ηjuj(c
j∗
0 , l
j∗
0 ).
that also leads to contradiction.
Theorem 3 For every i, φi(η) is compact valued, upper semi-continuous and
convex.
Proof : It is easy to check that, for given η ∈ ∆,
U(η,k, c, l) =
∞∑
t=0
m∑
i=1
ηiβ
t
iui(c
i
t, l
i
t)
is continuous over ∆ × Π(k0)×
∑
(k0), Π(k0)×
∑
(k0) are compact, it follows
from Berge’s Theorem that ci∗t (η), k∗t (η), li∗t (η) are continuous functions of η for
the product topology.
Let ηn ∈ ∆ and ηn → η.
i) Assume that ci∗t (ηn)→ ci∗t (η) = 0.
It follows from Assumption A1 that
∀i ∈ I = {i|ηni > 0}, lim
ε→0
ui(ε, 1)
ε
< +∞,
we have
ηiβ
t
iui(c
i∗
t (η
n), li∗t (η
n))− ηiβtiui(0, li∗t (ηn))
≥ ηiβtiu1it (ci∗t (ηn), li∗t (ηn))ci∗t (ηn)
=
[
λ1t (η
n)− λ2it (ηn)
]
ci∗t (η
n) = λ1t (η
n)ci∗t (η
n). (19)
Thus
0 ≤ λ1t (ηn) ≤ ηni βti
ui(ci∗t (ηn), li∗t (ηn))
ci∗t (ηn)
≤ ηni βti
ui(ci∗t (ηn), 1)
ci∗t (ηn)
≤ 2α,
when ηn is close to η, where α = limε→0
ui(ε,1)
ε . This shows that λ
1
t (η
n) is
bounded from above.
Moreover,
∞∑
t=0
λ1t (η
n) ≤ α
∞∑
t=0
ηni β
t
i < +∞ when ηn is close to η. Hence there
exists a subsequence of {λ1t (ηn)}, denoted again by {λ1t (ηn)}, say λ1t (ηn) →
λ1t (η) ∈ l1+.
Furthermore, from (19) we get
∞∑
t=0
u1it (c
i∗
t (η
n), li∗t (η
n)) < +∞
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It implies from (10) λ2it (η
n) ∈ l1+ when ηn → η.
ii) Assume that li∗t (ηn)→ li∗t (η) = 0. We shall prove that
w∗t (η
n) = λ1t (η
n)f2t (k
∗
t (η
n), L∗t (η
n))→ λ1t (η)f2t (k∗t (η), L∗t (η)) ∈ l1+.
For any ν ∈ (0, ε), limε→0 ui(ν,ε)ε < limε→0 ui(ε,1)ε < +∞ which implies
lim
ε→0
ui(0, ε)
ε
< lim
ε→0
ui(ν, ε)
ε
< +∞.
We have
ηiβ
t
iui(c
i∗
t (η
n), li∗t (η
n))− ηiβtiui(ci∗t (ηn), 0)
≥ ηiβtiu2it (ci∗t (ηn), li∗t (ηn))li∗t (ηn)
= [w∗t (η
n)− λ4it (ηn) + λ5it (ηn)]li∗t (ηn)
= [w∗t (η
n) + λ5it (η
n)]li∗t (η
n) ≥ w∗t (ηn)li∗t (ηn)
This implies
w∗t (ηn)
ηni β
t
i
≤ ui(c
i∗
t (η
n), li∗t (ηn))
li∗t (ηn)
≤M < +∞ as ηn → η.
It follows that
∞∑
t=0
w∗t (η
n) ≤
∞∑
t=0
ηni β
t
iM < +∞ when ηn → η.
Similarly, we get
u2it (c
i∗(ηn), li∗(ηn))li∗(ηn)
ηni β
t
i
≤M1 < +∞ ,
λ5it (η
n)
ηni β
t
i
≤M2 < +∞ as ηn → η
then
∞∑
t=0
u2it (c
i∗(ηn), li∗(ηn)) < +∞ and
∞∑
t=0
λ5it (η
n) < +∞ as ηn → η.
Thus, it follows from (11) that λ4it (η
n), λ5it (η
n) belong to l1+ when η
n → η.
iii) If ci∗t (ηn)→ ci∗t (η) > 0, we have
ηiβ
t
iui(c
i∗
t (η
n), li∗t (η
n))− ηiβtiui(0, li∗t (ηn))
≥ ηiβtiu1it (ci∗t (ηn), li∗t (ηn))ci∗t (ηn)
=
[
λ1t (η
n)− λ2it (ηn)
]
ci∗t (η
n) = λ1t (η
n)ci∗t (η
n).
or
0 ≤ λ1t (ηn) ≤ ηni βti
ui(ci∗t (ηn), li∗t (ηn))
ci∗t (ηn)
≤ 2M when ηn → η.
where M =
ui(ci∗t (η), li∗t (η))
ci∗t (η)
< +∞
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This means λ1t (η
n) contains a convergent subsequence, denoted again by λ1t (η
n),
say λ1t (η
n)→ λ1t (η) and
∞∑
t=0
λ1t (η) ≤M
∞∑
t=0
ηiβ
t
i < +∞.
iv) If li∗t (ηn) → li∗t (η) > 0. By the same argument above, we get w∗t (ηn) →
w∗t (η) ∈ l1+.
We have proved that λ1t (η
n), λ2it (η
n), λ4it (η
n), λ5it (η
n), w∗t (ηn) belong to l1+
when ηn → η.We shall show that λ3t (ηn) ∈ l1+ when ηn → η. Indeed, we have :
+∞ >
∞∑
t=0
λ1t (η
n)F (k∗t (η
n), L∗t (η
n))−
∞∑
t=0
λ1t (η
n)F (0, 0) ≥
∞∑
t=0
λ1t (η
n)f1t (k
∗
t (η
n), L∗t (η
n))k∗t (η
n) +
∞∑
t=0
λ1t (η
n)f2t (k
∗
t (η
n), L∗t (η
n))L∗t (η
n)
This implies that
∞∑
t=0
λ1t (η
n)f1t (k
∗
t (η
n), L∗t (η
n))k∗t (η
n) < +∞ ∀t (20)
Since f ′k(0,m) > 1, then for all k0 > 0, there exists some 0 < k̂ < k0 such that:
0 < k̂ < F (k0,m) + (1− δ)k0.
0 < k̂ < F (k̂,m) + (1− δ)k̂
Take a feasible sequences from k0 :
k = (k0, k̂, k̂, ...)
(c, l) = ((0, 0), (0, 0), ...)
It follows from (18) that
[λ1t (η
n)f1t (k
∗
t (η
n), L∗t (η
n)) + (1− δ)λ1t (ηn)− λ1t−1(ηn)]k∗t (ηn) ≥
[λ1t (η
n)f1t (k
∗
t (η
n), L∗t (η
n)) + (1− δ)λ1t (ηn)− λ1t−1(ηn)]k̂.
This implies
∞∑
t=0
λ1t (η
n)f1t (k
∗
t (η
n), L∗t (η
n))k̂ ≤
∞∑
t=0
λ1t f
1
t (k
∗
t (η
n), L∗t (η
n))k∗t (η
n) +
∞∑
t=0
[(1− δ)λ1t (ηn)− λ1t−1(ηn)]k∗t (ηn) +
∞∑
t=0
[λ1t−1(η
n)− (1− δ)λ1t (ηn)]k̂.
It follows from (20), 0 ≤ k∗t ≤ max(k0, k) and λ1t (ηn)→ λ1t (η) ∈ l1+ , by using a
convergent subsequence, we can say that
∞∑
t=0
λ1t (η
n)f1t (k
∗
t (η
n), L∗t (η
n)) < +∞ when ηn → η.
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Therefore, from (12), we conclude λ3t (η) ∈ l1+.
Now, take y(ηn) ∈ φi(ηn), then there exists λ1t (ηn) such that
yn =
∞∑
t=0
λ1t (η
n)ci∗t (η
n) +
∞∑
t=0
w∗t (η
n)li∗t (η
n)
−
∞∑
t=0
w∗t (η
n)−ϑirk0 − αipi∗(ηn)
where
pi∗(ηn) =
∞∑
t=0
λ1t (η
n)F (k∗t (η
n), L∗t (η
n))−
∞∑
t=0
λ1t (η
n)(k∗t+1(η
n)
−(1− δ)k∗t (ηn))−
∞∑
t=0
w∗t (η
n)L∗t (η
n)− λ
1
0(η
n)(1− δ)
2
k0
We may suppose that y(ηn) → y(η). It follows from the continuity of ci∗t (ηn),
k∗t (ηn), li∗t (ηn), F (k∗t (ηn), L∗t (ηn)) that
∀t, λ1t (ηn)→ λ1t (η) ∈ l1+, w∗t (ηn)→ w∗t (η) ∈ l1+.
By taking ηn → η in all the inequalities and equalities from (1) to (6) in the
Proposition 1,all λ1t (η), λ
2i
t (η), λ
3
t (η), λ
4i
t (η), λ
5i
t (η) satisfy conditions (1) − (6).
This means λ(η) is Lagrange Multipliers of the Pareto-Optimum problem.
Therefore, we have y(η) ∈ φi(η). Moreover, φi(η) is bounded. Hence φi(η)
is compact valued and upper semi-continuous.
We shall prove that φi(η) is convex .
For given weights η ∈ ∆, each consumer’s utility function is strictly concave,
the Pareto-optimum problem will have unique solution for each η ∈ ∆. Thus,
the maps
(ci∗t (η), k
∗
t (η), l
i∗
t (η)) = argmaxU(η,k, c, l) over Π(k0)×
∑
(k0)
is well-defined on ∆.
Let y ∈ φi(η), y, ∈ φi(η), there exists two sequences {λ1t }, {λ,1t } such that
y ∈ φi(λ1t (η)), y, ∈ φi(λ,1t (η)).
We have, for all α ∈ [0, 1],
αy1 + (1− α)y, =
∞∑
t=0
[αλ1t (η) + (1− α)λ,1t (η)]ci∗t
∞
+
∑
t=0
[αλ1t (η) + (1− α)λ,1t (η)]f2t (k∗t , L∗t )li∗t
−
∞∑
t=0
[αλ1t (η) + (1− α)λ,1t (η)]f2t (k∗t , L∗t )−ϑirk0
17
− αi[
∞∑
t=0
(αλ1t (η) + (1− α)λ,1t (η))F (k∗t , L∗t )
−
∞∑
t=0
(αλ1t (η) + (1− α)λ,1t (η))(k∗t+1 − (1− δ)k∗t )
−
∞∑
t=0
(αλ1t (η) + (1− α)λ,1t (η))f2t (k∗t , L∗t )L∗t − rk0]
Since λ1t (η) and λ
,1
t (η) satisfy the conditions (1) − (6), it is easy to check that
αλ1t (η) + (1− α)λ,1t (η) satisfies (1)− (6). Thus, αλ1t (η) + (1− α)λ,1t (η) is also
Lagrange multipliers for Pareto-Optimum problem.
Therefore, αy1 + (1− α)y, ∈ φi(η) or φi(η) is convex .
We now use the Browder Fixed-Point Theorem for Multivalued Maps with
Boundary Condition to prove there exists an equilibrium.
Theorem 4 (See Zeidler[1992], Theorem 9.C) Suppose that
(i) the map T (η) : ∆ → 2X is upper semi-continuous, and that ∆ is a
nonempty, compact, convex set in a locally convex space X;
(ii) the set T (η) is nonempty, closed, and convex for all η ∈ ∆;
(iii) one of the following two boundary conditions is satisfied:
For every η ∈ ∂∆ there are points ζ ∈ T (η) and ξ ∈ ∆,
and a number a > 0 such that ζ = η + a(ξ − η);
For every η ∈ ∂∆ there are points ζ ∈ T (η) and ξ ∈ ∆,
and a number a < 0 such that ζ = η + a(ξ − η);
Then T (η) has a fixed point.
Lemma 2 ( The inward boundary condition)
For given η ∈ ∆, k0 > 0 and φ(η) = (φ1(η), φ2(η), ..., φm(η)) ∈ Rm . If
ηi = 0 then for all y ∈ φ(η), yi < 0.
Proof : Indeed, if there exists i such that ηi = 0 then, by the Proposition 2(ii),
ci∗t = 0, li∗t = 0 for all t.
Then, if y ∈ φ(η),
yi ∈ φi(η)
= {
∞∑
t=0
p∗t (η)c
i∗
t (η) +
∞∑
t=0
w∗t (η)l
i∗
t (η)−
∞∑
t=0
w∗t (η)−ϑirk0 − αipi∗(η)}
= {−
∞∑
t=0
w∗t (η)−ϑirk0 − αipi∗(η)}.
It follows from Proposition 2(i) that yi < 0.
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Theorem 5 Let k0 > 0. Then there exists η ∈ ∆, η >> 0, such that 0 ∈
φi(η),∀i, that means there exist an equilibrium.
Proof : Let T (η) = η + φ(η), T (η) = (T1(η), T2(η), ..., Tm(η)).It follows from
Lemma 2 that ηi = 0 implies yi ∈ φi(η) ⊂ R− − or yi ∈ Ti(η) and yi < 0. From
the Theorem 4, there exists η such that η ∈ T (η). This implies that 0 ∈ φ(η)
or 0 ∈ φi(η) for all i = 1...m.
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